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Abstract. Today, humans have a critical impact on the Earth system and vice versa, which can generate com-
plex feedback processes between social and ecological dynamics. Integrating human behavior into formal Earth
system models (ESMs), however, requires crucial modeling assumptions about actors and their goals, behav-
ioral options, and decision rules, as well as modeling decisions regarding human social interactions and the
aggregation of individuals’ behavior. Here, we review existing modeling approaches and techniques from vari-
ous disciplines and schools of thought dealing with human behavior at different levels of decision making. We
demonstrate modelers’ often vast degrees of freedom but also seek to make modelers aware of the often crucial
consequences of seemingly innocent modeling assumptions.
After discussing which socioeconomic units are potentially important for ESMs, we compare models of in-
dividual decision making that correspond to alternative behavioral theories and that make diverse modeling as-
sumptions about individuals’ preferences, beliefs, decision rules, and foresight. We review approaches to model
social interaction, covering game theoretic frameworks, models of social influence, and network models. Finally,
we discuss approaches to studying how the behavior of individuals, groups, and organizations can aggregate to
complex collective phenomena, discussing agent-based, statistical, and representative-agent modeling and eco-
nomic macro-dynamics. We illustrate the main ingredients of modeling techniques with examples from land-use
dynamics as one of the main drivers of environmental change bridging local to global scales.
1 Introduction
Even though Earth system models (ESMs) are used to study
human impacts on the complex interdependencies between
various compartments of the Earth, humans are not repre-
sented explicitly in these models. ESMs usually consider hu-
man influence in terms of scenarios for comparison of the
impacts of alternative narratives about the future develop-
ment of key socioeconomic characteristics. For instance, the
IPCC process uses integrated assessment models to compute
plausible future emission pathways from energy and land use
for different scenarios of climate mitigation. These projec-
tions determine the radiative forcing used as external input
in ESMs to study its natural impacts (Moss et al., 2010;
IPCC, 2014). The latter can, however, have socioeconomic
consequences that may be fed back into the scenario pro-
cess. However, the complex interplay of the dynamics of the
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natural Earth system and the social, cultural, and economic
responses to them are not captured.
The concept of the Anthropocene epoch implies that hu-
mans have become a dominant geological force interfer-
ing with biophysical Earth system processes (Crutzen, 2002;
Maslin and Lewis, 2015). However, a changing environment
also alters human behavior (Palmer and Smith, 2014). For
example, climate change will affect land use and energy con-
sumption. Likewise, perceived environmental risks modify
consumption and mobility patterns. Therefore, with increas-
ing human impact on the Earth system, feedbacks between
shifts in the biophysical Earth system and human responses
will gain importance (Donges et al., 2017c, b; Thornton et al.,
2017). Donges et al. (2017a) provide a classification of these
feedbacks in this Special Issue.
Studying feedback loops between human behavior and the
Earth system, projecting its consequences, and developing
interventions to manage the human impact on the Earth sys-
tem requires a suitable dynamic representation of human be-
havior and decision making. In fact, even a very accurate sta-
tistical description of human behavior may be insufficient for
several reasons. First, in a closed loop, humans constantly
respond to changes in the Earth system, facing novel envi-
ronmental conditions and decision problems. Hence, their
response cannot be predicted with a statistical model. Sec-
ond, for a correct assessment of different policy options (e.g.,
command and control policy vs. market-based solutions), a
sound theoretical and empirical account of the principles un-
derlying decision making in the relevant context is needed
because they guide the development of intervention pro-
grams, such as incentives schemes, social institutions, and
nudges (Ostrom, 1990; Schelling, 1978; Thaler and Sunstein,
2009). A statistical model could mislead decision makers that
want to design policy interventions to induce changes in hu-
man behavior.
Incorporating human behavior in ESMs is challenging. In
contrast to physical laws that traditional ESMs can use as a
basis, there is no single theory of human behavior that can be
taken as a general law (Rosenberg, 2012). The understanding
of human behavior is limited by its determinants often being
contingent and socially formed by norms and institutions.
This allows for a view on social systems as socially con-
structed realities, which is in stark contrast to the positivist
epistemology of one objective reality prevalent in the natu-
ral sciences. In fact, past attempts to develop grand theories
have been criticized for being too remote from reality and,
as a consequence, hard if not impossible to test empirically
(Boudon, 1981; Hedström and Udehn, 2009; Hedström and
Ylikoski, 2010; Merton, 1957). Accordingly, many social
scientists favor a so-called “middle-range approach”, trying
to tailor theoretical models to specific contexts rather than
developing overarching general theories. This acknowledges,
for instance, that individuals act in some contexts egoisti-
cally and based on rational calculus, while in other contexts
they may act altruistically and according to simple heuris-
tics. The principles that determine human decisions depend
on, for example, whether the decision maker has faced the
decision problem before, the complexity of the decision, the
amount of time and information available to the individual,
and whether the decision affects others or is framed in a spe-
cific social situation. Likewise, different actor types might
apply different decision principles. Furthermore, the deci-
sion determinants of agents can be affected by others through
social interactions or aggregate outcomes of collective pro-
cesses.
Here, we give an overview of existing approaches to model
human behavior and decision making to provide readers with
a toolbox of model ingredients. Rather than promoting one
theory and dismissing another, we list decisions that model-
ers face when modeling humans, point to important model-
ing options, and discuss methodological principles that help
in developing the best model for a given purpose.
We define decision making as the cognitive process of de-
liberately choosing between alternative actions, which may
involve analytic and intuitive modes of thinking. Actions are
intentional and subjectively meaningful activities of an agent.
Behavior, in contrast, is a broader concept that also includes
unconscious and automatic activities, such as habits and re-
flexes. The outcome of a decision is therefore a certain type
of behavior, which might be explained by a decision-making
theory.
In ESMs, only those human decisions and behaviors that
have a considerable impact on the Earth system are relevant,
i.e., primarily behavior towards the environment of a large
number of individuals or decisions amplified through the so-
cial position of the decision maker or technology. Therefore,
this paper also covers techniques to model interactions be-
tween agents and to aggregate behavior and interactions to
a macrolevel. On the microlevel, relevant decisions include
the reproduction, consumption, and production of energy-
and material-intensive products, place of living, and land use.
These decisions lead to aggregate and long-term dynamics of
populations, production and consumption patterns, and mi-
gration.
There are diverse social science theories explaining human
behavior and decision making in environmental and ecologi-
cal contexts, for example in environmental economics, soci-
ology, and psychology. In this paper, we focus on mathemat-
ical and computational models of human decision making
and behavior. Here, we understand the terms “modeling ap-
proach” and “modeling technique” as a class of mathematical
or computational structures that can be interpreted as a sim-
plified representation of physical objects and actors or col-
lections thereof, events and processes, causal relations, or in-
formation flows. Modeling approaches draw on theories of
human behavior that make – often contested – assumptions
about the structure of decision processes. Furthermore, mod-
eling approaches can have different purposes: the objective
of descriptive models is to explore empirical questions (e.g.,
which components and processes can explain the system’s
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dynamics), while normative models aim at answering ethi-
cal questions (e.g., which policy we should choose to reach a
certain goal).
Recent reviews focus on existing modeling approaches
and theories that are applied in the context of environmental
management and change. For example, Verburg et al. (2016)
assess existing modeling approaches and identify challenges
for improving these models in order to better understand
Anthropocene dynamics. An (2012), Meyfroidt (2013), and
Schlüter et al. (2017) focus on cognitive and behavioral theo-
ries in ecological contexts, providing an overview for devel-
opers of agent-based, land-use, and social–ecological mod-
els. Cooke et al. (2009) and Balint et al. (2017) review differ-
ent micro- and macro-approaches with applications to agro-
ecology and the economics of climate change, respectively.
The present paper complements this literature by review-
ing modeling approaches of (1) individual agent behavior,
(2) agent interactions, and (3) the aggregation of individual
behaviors with the aim of supporting the integration of hu-
man decision making and behavior into Earth system models.
The combination of these three different categories is cru-
cial to describe human behavior at scales relevant for Earth
system dynamics. Furthermore, this review highlights the
strengths and limitations of different approaches by connect-
ing the modeling techniques and their underlying assump-
tions about human behavior and discusses criteria to guide
modeling choices.
Our survey of techniques has a bias towards economic
modeling techniques for two simple reasons. First, eco-
nomics is the social science discipline that has the longest
and strongest tradition in the formal modeling of human deci-
sion making. Second, economics focuses on the study of pro-
duction and consumption as well as the allocation of scarce
resources. In most industrialized countries today, a major
part of human interactions with the environment is medi-
ated through markets, which are central in economic analy-
ses. This review aims to go beyond the often narrow framing
of economic approaches while at the same time not ignor-
ing important economic insights. For instance, consumption
and production decisions not only follow purely economic
calculations, but are also deeply influenced, for instance, by
behavioral patterns, traditions, and social norms (The World
Bank, 2015).
Because we discuss different approaches to model deci-
sion making and behavior from various disciplinary or sub-
disciplinary scientific fields, there are considerable differ-
ences in terminology that make a harmonized presentation
of the material challenging. For example, the same terms are
used to describe quite separate varieties of an approach in
different fields, and different terms from separate fields may
refer to very similar approaches. We adopt a terminology that
aims for a better interdisciplinary understanding and point
out different understandings of contested terms where we are
aware of them.
This paper works with land-use change as a guiding and
illustrative example. Land-cover change and land use make
up the second-largest source of greenhouse gases – besides
the burning of fossil fuels – and thus contribute strongly to
climate change. Behavioral responses related to land use will
play a crucial role for successful mitigation and adaptation
to projected climatic changes, thereby challenging modelers
to represent decision making in models of land-use change
(Brown et al., 2017). The complexity of land-use change pro-
vides various examples of how collective and individual de-
cision making interacts with the environment across spatial
scales and organizational levels. Land-use models consider
environmental conditions as important factors in decision-
making processes, giving rise to feedbacks between environ-
mental and socioeconomic dynamics (Brown et al., 2016).
However, this paper does not provide an exhaustive overview
of existing land-use models. For this purpose, the reader is
referred to the various reviews in the literature (e.g., Baker,
1989; Brown et al., 2004; Michetti, 2012; Groeneveld et al.,
2017).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Sect. 2, we give an overview of different levels of descrip-
tion of social systems and the socioeconomic units or agents
associated with them. Sections 3–5 form the main part of the
paper, presenting different modeling techniques and their un-
derlying assumptions about human decision making and be-
havior. First, Sect. 3 introduces approaches to model indi-
vidual decisions and behavior from rational choice to learn-
ing theories. Many of these techniques can be used to also
model higher-level social entities. Second, Sect. 4 puts the fo-
cus on techniques for modeling interactions between agents.
Strategic interactions and social influence are significant de-
terminants of individual decisions and therefore important
for long-term changes in collective behavior, i.e., the group
outcome of mutually dependent individual decisions. Third,
Sect. 5 reviews different aggregation techniques that allow
for a description of human activities at the level of social col-
lectives or systems. These approaches make use of simplifi-
cations to scale up theories about individual decision mak-
ing. Figure 1 summarizes these main parts of the paper, the
corresponding modeling approaches, and important consid-
erations for model selection, which we discuss in detail in
Sect. 6. The discussion also reflects on important distinctions
between models of natural and social systems that are crucial
to consider when including human behavior into ESMs. The
paper concludes with remarks on the remaining challenges
for this endeavor.
2 The challenge: modeling decision making and
behavior across different levels of organization
The decision making and behavior of humans can be de-
scribed and analyzed at different levels of social systems.
While decisions are made and behavior is performed by in-
www.earth-syst-dynam.net/8/977/2017/ Earth Syst. Dynam., 8, 977–1007, 2017
980 F. Müller-Hansen et al.: Approaches to represent human behavior in ESMs
Figure 1. Overview of modeling categories, corresponding modeling approaches, and techniques discussed in this paper and important
considerations for model choice and assumptions about human behavior and decision making.
dividual humans, it is often useful to not represent individ-
ual humans in a model but to treat social collectives, such
as households, neighborhoods, cities, political and economic
organizations, and states, as decision makers or agents.
Figure 2 shows a hierarchy of socioeconomic units, i.e.,
the groups, organizations, and structures of individuals that
play a crucial role in human interactions with the Earth sys-
tem. We consider a broad scheme of levels ranging from the
microlevel across intermediate levels to the global level. This
hierarchy of socioeconomic units is not only distinguish-
able by level of complexity but also by the different spatial
scales involved. However, there is no one-to-one correspon-
dence. For instance, some individuals have impacts at the
global level, while many transnational organizations operate
at specific local levels. Especially in the context of human–
environment interactions in ESMs, scaling and spatial extent
are therefore important issues (Gibson et al., 2000). Further-
more, we note that the strict separation between a microlevel
and macrolevel may result in treating very different phenom-
ena alike. For instance, many economic models describe both
small businesses and transnational corporations as actors on
the microlevel and model their decision processes with the
same set of assumptions, even though they operate very dif-
ferently.
One major challenge for modeling humans in the Earth
system is therefore to bridge the diverse levels between in-
dividuals and the global scale, thereby integrating different
levels of social organization and spatial and temporal scales.
The relation between individual agents and social collec-
tives and structures has been the subject of considerable de-
bate in the social sciences. In the social scientific tradition
of methodological individualism1, the analysis aims to ex-
plain social macro-phenomena, for example phenomena at
the level of groups, organizations, or societies, with theories
1We note that there are different accounts of methodological in-
dividualism, and it often remains unclear to what extent structural
and interactionist elements can be part of an explanation (see Hodg-
son, 2007; Udehn, 2002).
of individual behavior. This approach deviates from struc-
turalist traditions, which claim that collective phenomena are
of their own kind and thus cannot be traced back to the behav-
ior of individuals (Durkheim, 2014). Positions between these
two extremes emphasize the interdependency of individual
agents and social structure, which is understood as an emerg-
ing phenomenon that stabilizes particular behaviors (Cole-
man, 1994; Homans, 1950). While it very much depends
on the purpose of the given modeling exercise whether the
model should represent individuals or collectives, we mainly
focus here on the research tradition that acknowledges the
fact that complex and unexpected collective phenomena can
arise from the interplay of individual behavior.
In Table 1, we provide an overview of socioeconomic units
at different levels that are potentially important for Earth sys-
tem modeling. We list common theories, frameworks and
assumptions made about decision making and behavior for
these socioeconomic units and link them to scientific fields
that focus on them.
At the microlevel, models consider individuals, house-
holds, families, and small businesses. For instance, individ-
uals can make decisions as policy makers, investors, busi-
ness managers, consumers, or resource users. At this level,
decisions about lifestyle, consumption, individual natural re-
source use, migration, and reproduction are particularly rele-
vant in the environmental context. Individual decisions have
to be made by a large number of individuals or have to be re-
inforced by organizations, institutions, or technology to be-
come relevant at the level of the Earth system. Individuals’
participation in collective decision processes, such as voting,
may also have consequences for the environment at a global
level.
At various intermediate levels, communities and organi-
zations like firms, political parties, labor unions, educational
institutions, and nongovernmental and lobby organizations
play a crucial role in shaping economic and political deci-
sions and therefore have a huge impact on aggregate behav-
ior. Governments at different levels representing different ter-
Earth Syst. Dynam., 8, 977–1007, 2017 www.earth-syst-dynam.net/8/977/2017/
F. Müller-Hansen et al.: Approaches to represent human behavior in ESMs 981
Table 1. Overview of particular levels of description of socioeconomic units, associated scientific fields and communities, and some common
approaches and assumptions about decisions and behavior. The list gives a broad overview but is far from being exhaustive.
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Figure 2. Socioeconomic units and their corresponding level and scales.
ritories, from cities to nation states, enact laws that strongly
frame the economic and social activities of their citizens. Im-
portant decisions for the Earth system context include envi-
ronmental regulations and standards, the production and dis-
tribution of commodities and assets, trade, the extraction and
use of natural resources, and the development and building
of physical infrastructures.
At the global level, multinational companies and intergov-
ernmental organizations negotiate decisions. This level has
considerable impacts on policy and business decisions even
though it is remote from the daily life of most individuals.
Often this level provides framing for activities on lower or-
ganizational levels and thus strongly influences the problem
statements and perceived solutions, for instance regarding
environmental issues. Decisions important for the Earth sys-
tem at this level include international climate and trade agree-
ments, the decisions of internationally operating corporations
and financial institutions, and the adoption of global frame-
works like the UN Sustainable Development Goals (United
Nations General Assembly, 2015).
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An overarching question that has triggered considerable
debate between different disciplines is the allocation of
agency at different levels of description. Even if individu-
als can decide between numerous options, the perception of
options and decisions between them are shaped by social
context and institutional embedding. Institutions2 and orga-
nizations can display their own dynamics and lead to out-
comes unintended by the individuals. On the other hand,
social movements can initiate disruptive changes in institu-
tional development. The attribution and perception of agency
for a specific problem is therefore important for the choice of
a suitable level of model description. The following section
starts our discussion of different modeling techniques at the
level of individual decision making and behavior.
3 Modeling individual behavior and decision making
In a nutshell, models of individual decision making and be-
havior differ with regard to their assumptions about three cru-
cial determinants of human choices: goals, restrictions, and
decision rules (Hedström, 2005; Lindenberg, 2001, 1990,
1985). First, the models assume that individuals have mo-
tives, goals, or preferences. That is, agents rank goods or
outcomes in terms of their desirability and seek to realize
highly ranked outcomes. A prominent but debated assump-
tion of many models is that preferences or goals are assumed
to be stable over time. Stable preferences are included to pre-
vent researchers from developing trivial explanations, as a
theory that models a given change in behavior only based on
changed preferences does not have explanatory power. How-
ever, empirical research shows that preferences can change
even in relatively short time frames (Ackermann et al., 2016).
Changing individuals’ goals or preferences is an important
mechanism to affect their behavior, for example through poli-
cies, making flexible preferences particularly interesting for
Earth system modelers.
Second, decision models make assumptions about restric-
tions and opportunities that constrain or help agents pursue
their goals. For instance, each behavioral option comes with
certain costs (e.g., money and time), and decision makers
form more or less accurate beliefs about these costs and how
likely they are to occur depending on the information avail-
able to the agent.
2The notion of institution is used in the literature with slightly
different meanings: (1) formal and informal rules that shape behav-
ior, (2) informal social order, i.e., regular patterns of behavior, and
(3) organizations. Here, we adopt an understanding of institutions
as formal (e.g., law, property rights) or informal rules (e.g., norms,
religion). However, formal rules often manifest in social, political,
and economic organizations and informal rules may be shaped by
them.
Third, models assume that agents apply some decision rule
that translates their preferences and restrictions into a choice.
Although decision rules differ very much in their complex-
ity, they can be categorized into three types. First, there are
decision rules that are forward looking. Rational choice the-
ory, for instance, assumes that individuals list all positive and
negative future consequences of a decision and choose the
optimal option. Alternatively, backward-looking approaches,
such as classical reinforcement learning, assume that actors
remember the satisfaction experienced when they chose a
given behavior in the past and tend to choose a behavior with
a high satisfaction again. Finally, there are sideward-looking
decision rules, which assume that actors adopt the behavior
of others, for instance because they imitate successful others
(Kandori et al., 1993). Theories assume different degrees of
the context dependency of rules and make different implicit
assumptions about the underlying cognitive capabilities of
agents.
In the remainder of this section, we describe in more de-
tail three important approaches to individual decision making
and point out typical assumptions about motives, restrictions,
and decision rules.
3.1 Optimal decisions and utility theory in rational
choice models
Rational choice theory, a standard model in many social sci-
ences (especially in economics) that is widely studied in
mathematics, assumes that decision making is goal oriented:
rational agents have preferences and choose the strategy with
the expected outcome that is most preferred, given some ex-
ternal constraints and potentially based on their beliefs (rep-
resented by subjective probability distributions; see the be-
liefs, preferences, and constraints model in Gintis, 2009). It
can either be used to represent actual behavior or serve as a
normative benchmark for other theories of behavior.
How to judge the “rationality” of individual decisions is
subject to ongoing debates. Opp (1999) distinguishes be-
tween strong rationality (“homo economicus”), assuming
purely self-interested agents with unlimited cognitive capac-
ities knowing all possible actions and probabilities of con-
sequences, and weak rationality that makes less strong as-
sumptions. Rabin (2002) distinguishes between standard and
nonstandard assumptions regarding preferences, beliefs, and
decision-making rules. Before discussing nonoptimal deci-
sion making in Sect. 3.2, we review here common assump-
tions on preferences and beliefs.
Usually, agents are assumed to be mainly self-interested,
having fixed preferences regarding their personal conse-
quences in possible futures and being indifferent to how a de-
cision was made and to consequences for others. Exceptions
are procedural (Hansson, 1996; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) and
other-regarding preferences (Mueller, 2003; Fehr and Fis-
chbacher, 2003).
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Preferences can be modeled as binary preference relations,
x Pi y, denoting that individual i prefers situation or out-
come x to y. Most authors assume that Pi is complete (for
every pair (x,y) either xPiy or yPix) and transitive (if xPiy
and yPiz then xPiz), which allows for the representation
of the preferences with a utility function ui (Von Neumann
and Morgenstern, 1953).3 Some authors also allow for in-
complete or cyclic preferences (Fishburn, 1968; Heitzig and
Simmons, 2012). In the land-use context, i could be a farmer,
x might denote growing some traditional crops generating a
moderate profit, and y growing hybrid seeds for more profit
but making i dependent on the seed supplier. If i considers in-
dependence valuable enough to make up for the lower profit,
x Pi y would denote i’s preference of x over y.
In decision making under uncertainty, agents have to
choose between different risky prospects modeled as prob-
ability distributions p(x) over outcomes x. In expected util-




′(x)ui(x). Empirical research shows that only a minor-
ity of people evaluate uncertainty in this risk-neutral way
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Prospect theory therefore
models agents that overestimate small probabilities and eval-
uate outcomes relative to a reference point, which leads
to risk-averse or risk-seeking behavior regarding losses or
gains, respectively. (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Bruhin
et al., 2010). A conceptual example from the land-use con-
text illustrates decision making under risk. A farmer i might
face the choice of whether to stick to her current crop x or
switch to a new crop y. She may think that with 20 % proba-
bility the switch will result in a 50 % reduction in her profits,
while with 80 % probability the profits would double. If her
utility is proportional to the profits and she evaluates this un-
certain prospect as described by expected utility theory, her
gain from switching to y would be positive. If, however, she
is averse to losses and thus conforms to prospect theory, she
might evaluate the switch as negative and prefer to stick to x.
If several time points t are involved in a decision, agents
are typically assumed to discount future consequences by us-
ing utility weights that decay in time and reflect the agent’s
time preferences. Discounted utility quantifies the present
desirability of some utility obtained in the future. Most au-
thors use exponentially decaying weights of the form e−rt
with a discounting rate r > 0 because this makes the evalua-
tion independent of its time point. However, empirical stud-
ies suggest that people often use slower decaying weights
(e.g., hyperbolic discounting), especially in the presence of
uncertainty (Ainslie and Haslam, 1992; Jamison and Jami-
son, 2011), although this might lead to time-inconsistent
choices that appear suboptimal at a later time. A farmer i
may compare different crops not only by next year’s expected
profit ui(x,1) but, due to the various crops’ different effects
on future soil quality, also by future years’ profits ui(x, t) for
3ui (x)> ui (y) implies x Pi y, where ui is only defined up to
positive linear (affine) transformations.
t > 1. Crop y might promise higher yields than x in the short
run but lower ones in the long run due to faster soil depletion.
If i is “patient”, having small r , she might prefer y Pi x even
though ui(x,1)> ui(y,1).
Preferences can be aggregated not only in time but also
across several interrelated issues or consequences. For exam-
ple, consumer theory (Varian, 2010) models preferences over
consumption bundles by combining the utility derived from
consuming different products into a total consumption util-
ity and simply adding up these utilities or combining them in
some nonlinear way with imperfect substitutability of goods
(Leontief, Cobb–Douglas, or CES utility functions). A farm-
ers’ utility from leisure time and crop yield y(l) depending
on working time l might, for example, be combined using the
Cobb–Douglas utility function ui = yα(12− l)1−α for some
elasticity α ∈ (0,1).
Complex optimization problems arising from rational
choice theory can be solved by mathematical programming,
calculus of variations, and similar methods (see, e.g., Kamien
and Schwartz, 2012; Chong and Zak, 2013). Optimal deci-
sions under constraints are not only discussed as a descrip-
tion of human behavior, but are also often taken as the nor-
mative benchmark for comparison with other nonoptimal ap-
proaches that we discuss in Sect. 3.2.
Regarding decision modeling in ESMs, rational choice
theory is useful when agents have clear goals and possess
enough information and cognitive resources to assess the op-
timality of strategies. For instance, individuals’ decisions re-
garding long-term investments or the decisions of organiza-
tions, such as firms or governments, in competitive situations
can often be assumed to follow a rational choice model rea-
sonably well. It can also be useful when actors make repeated
similar decisions and can learn optimal strategies from fast
feedback, making them behave “as if” they were rational.
3.2 Bounded rationality and heuristic decision making
Empirical research on human decision making finds that in-
dividual behavior depends on the framing and context of
the decision (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Human deci-
sion making is characterized by deviations from the norma-
tive standards of the rational choice model, so-called cogni-
tive biases, challenging the assumption that rational choice
theory serves not only as a normative benchmark, but also
as a descriptive model of individual decision making. Bi-
ases can be the result of time-limited information processing
(Hilbert, 2012), heuristic decision making (Simon, 1956), or
emotional influences (e.g., wishful thinking, Babad and Katz,
1991; Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003). Bounded rationality
theory assumes that human decision making is constrained
by the cognitive capabilities of the agents in addition to the
constraints imposed by the environment and the available
information about it (Simon, 1956, 1997). In the economic
literature, non-transitive preferences, time-inconsistent dis-
counting, and deviations from expected utility that we al-
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ready introduced in the previous subsection are also often
considered as boundedly rational (Gintis, 2009). Boundedly
rational agents can be considered as satisficers that try to
find a satisfying action in a situation given their available in-
formation and cognitive capabilities (Gigerenzer and Selten,
2002).
Constraints on information processing imply that agents
do not integrate all the available information to compute the
utility of every possible option in complex decision situations
and choose an action with maximal utility. Instead, agents
use heuristics to judge the available information and choose
actions that lead to the more preferred outcome over less pre-
ferred ones. Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) define heuris-
tics in decision making as a “strategy that ignores part of the
information, with the goal of making decisions more quickly,
frugally, and/or accurately than more complex methods.” It
is argued that instead of an all-purpose tool, the mind carries
an “adaptive toolbox” of different heuristic decision schemes
applicable in particular environments (Gigerenzer and Sel-
ten, 2002; Todd and Gigerenzer, 2007).
In general, heuristic rules are formalized either as deci-
sion trees or flowcharts and consist of three building blocks:
one for information search, one for stopping the information
search, and one to derive a decision from the information
found. They evaluate a number of pieces of information – so-
called cues – to either categorize a certain object or to choose
between several options. Many heuristics evaluate these cues
in a certain order and make a decision as soon as a cue value
allows for classification or discriminates between options.
This is illustrated by means of the take-the-best heuristic:
pieces of information (cues) are compared between alterna-
tives according to a prescribed order, which is crucial for the
decision process. At each step in the cue order, some infor-
mation is searched for and evaluated. If the information does
not allow for discrimination between the options, the pro-
cess moves on to the next cue. This repeats as the process
moves down the cue order until a cue is reached for which
the differentiation between options is possible and the option
with the higher cue value is chosen. Another notable example
is the satisficing heuristic that evaluates information sequen-
tially and chooses the first option satisfying certain criteria.
Heuristics, especially cue orders, can be interpreted as en-
coding norms and preferences in individual decision making
as they prioritize features of different options over others and
hierarchically structure the evaluation of available informa-
tion. An overview and explanation of numerous other deci-
sion heuristics can be found in the recent review paper by
Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011).
Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) question the usefulness of ra-
tional choice theory as the normative benchmark because it
is not designed for so-called “large worlds” where informa-
tion relevant for the decision process is either unknown or
has to be estimated from small samples. Instead, they want
to relieve heuristic decision making of its stigma of cogni-
tive laziness, bias, and irrationality. With their account of
ecological rationality, they suggest that heuristics can also
serve as a normative choice model providing context-specific
rules for normative questions. This is motivated by the ob-
servation that in many real-world situations, especially when
high uncertainties are involved, some decision heuristics per-
form equally good or even better than more elaborated deci-
sion strategies (Dhami and Ayton, 2001; Dhami and Harries,
2001; Keller et al., 2014).
So far, heuristics have been used to describe decisions,
for instance in consumer choice (Hauser et al., 2009), voter
behavior (Lau and Redlawsk, 2006), and organizational be-
havior (Loock and Hinnen, 2015; Simon, 1997). However,
fast and frugal decision heuristics are not yet commonly ap-
plied in dynamic modeling of human–nature interactions.
One exception is the description of farmer and pastoralist
behavior in a study of the origins of conflict in East Africa
(Kennedy and Bassett, 2011). However, as the following
example shows, similar decision trees have been used to
model decision making in agent-based simulations of land-
use change. The model by Deadman et al. (2004) describes
colonist household decisions in the Amazon rainforest. Each
household is a potential farmer who first checks whether a
subsistence requirement is met. If this is not the case, the
household farms annual crops. If the subsistence requirement
is met, the household eventually plants perennials or breeds
livestock depending on the soil quality. The model shows
how heuristic decision trees can be used to simplify com-
plex decision processes and represent them in an intelligible
way. However, the example also shows the many degrees of
freedom in the construction of heuristics, pointing at the dif-
ficulty to obtain these structures from empirical research.
Heuristics are a promising tool for including individual hu-
man decision making into ESMs because they can capture
crucial choices in a computationally efficient way. In order to
describe the long-term evolution of preferences, norms, and
values relevant for human interactions with the Earth sys-
tem, heuristics could also be used to model meta-decisions
of preference or value adoption. Recent findings suggest that
cue orders can spread via social learning and social influence
(Gigerenzer et al., 2008; Hertwig and Herzog, 2009) anal-
ogously to norm and opinion spreading in social networks
(see Sects. 4.3 and 4.4), which could be a promising ap-
proach to model social change. However, in contrast to fully
rational decision making, it can be very challenging to ag-
gregate heuristic decision making analytically to higher or-
ganizational levels. Therefore, approaches like agent-based
modeling are suitable to explore the aggregate outcomes of
many agents with such decision rules (see Sect. 5.5).
3.3 Learning theory
The approaches discussed in the previous two subsections
mainly took the perspective of a forward-looking agent. Ra-
tional or boundedly rational actors optimize future payoffs
based on information or beliefs about how their behavior af-
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fects future payoffs, while the procedures to optimize may
be more or less bounded. However, these techniques do not
specify how the information is acquired and how the beliefs
are formed. Computational learning theory focuses on behav-
ior from a backward-looking perspective: an agent learned in
the past that a certain action gives a reward that feels good
or is satisfying and is therefore more likely to repeat this be-
havior. It can describe the adaptivity of agent behavior to a
changing environment and is particularly suited for modeling
behavior under limited information. To model the learning of
agents, unsupervised learning techniques are mostly used be-
cause they do not require training with an external correction.
Reinforcement learning is such a technique that models
how an agent maps environmental conditions to desirable ac-
tions in a way that optimizes a stream of rewards (and/or pun-
ishments). The obtained reward depends on the state of the
environment and the chosen action, but may also be influ-
enced by chosen actions and environmental conditions in the
past. According to Macy et al. (2013), reinforcement learning
differs from forward-looking behavioral models regarding
three key aspects. (1) Because agents explore the likely con-
sequences and learn from outcomes that actually occurred
rather than those which are intended to occur but may only
be obtained with a certain probability, reinforcement learn-
ing does not need to assume that the consequences are in-
tended. (2) Decisions are guided by rewards or punishments
that lead to approach or avoidance rather than by static util-
ities. (3) Learning is characterized by stepwise melioration
and models the dynamic search for an optimum rather than
assuming that the optimal strategy can be determined right
away.
The learning process is modeled via a learning algorithm
(e.g., Q-learning, SARSA learning, actor-critic learning)
based on iteratively evaluating the current value of the en-
vironmental state utilizing a temporal difference error of ex-
pected value and experience value (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
Artificial neural network algorithms can explore very high
dimensional state and action spaces. Genetic algorithms,
which are inspired by evolutionary mechanisms such as mu-
tation and selection, are also applied to learning problems.
The learning algorithm has to balance a trade-off between
the exploration of actions with unknown consequences and
the exploitation of current knowledge. In order to not exploit
only the currently learned strategy, many algorithms use ran-
domness to induce deviations from already learned behavior.
The environment in reinforcement learning problems is
often modeled with Markovian transition probabilities. The
special case of a single agent is called a Markov decision
process (Bellman, 1957). In each of the discrete states of the
environment the agent can choose from a set of possible ac-
tions. The choice then influences the transition probabilities
to the next state and the reward. As an illustration, consider a
farmer adapting her planting and irrigation practices to new
climatic conditions. The environment could be modeled by
a Markov process with different states of soil fertility and
moisture, in which transitions between states reflect the in-
fluence of stochastic weather events. Without the possibility
to acquire knowledge through other channels, she would ex-
plore different possible actions and evaluate how they change
the yield (her reward). Eventually, through a trial-and-error
process, her yield would increase on average.
A common approach to model the acquisition of subjective
probabilities associated with the consequences of actions is
Bayesian learning, which has also been applied to reinforce-
ment learning problems (Vlassis et al., 2012). Starting with
some prior probability (e.g., from some high-entropy “unin-
formative” distribution) P (hi) that some hypothesis hi about
the relation of actions and outcomes is true, new information
or evidence P (E) is used to update the subjective probabil-
ity with the posterior P (E|hi) calculated with Bayes’ the-
orem: P (hi |E)= P (E|hi)P (hi)/P (E) (Puga et al., 2015).
The most probable hypothesis can then be chosen to deter-
mine further action.
By combining various approaches to model the acquisi-
tion of beliefs through learning, the formation of preferences
and different decision rules discussed in the previous sections
with further insights from psychology and neuroscience has
led to the development of very diverse and detailed behav-
ioral theories which are often formalized in cognitive archi-
tectures (Balke and Gilbert, 2014). These approaches can be
used to describe human behavior in computational models,
but are too complex and diverse to discuss them here in de-
tail.
Learning and related theories that emphasize the adapt-
ability of human behavior might be important building
blocks to model the long-term evolution of human interac-
tions with the Earth system from an individual perspective.
On the other hand, they can capture short-term responses to
drastically changing natural environments that are relevant,
for instance, in the context of tipping elements in the Earth
system.
Table 2 summarizes the approaches that focus on indi-
vidual human behavior. Besides the forward- and backward-
looking behavior that we introduced in this section, agents
may exhibit sideways-looking behavior: agents can copy the
behavior of successful others, thereby contributing to a so-
cial learning process. For this kind of behavior, interactions
between different agents are crucial. This will be the focus of
the next section.
4 Modeling interactions between agents
In the previous section, we discussed modeling approaches
that focus on the choices of individuals that are confronted
with a decision in a specified situation. In contrast, this sec-
tion reviews techniques to model how actors interact with
each other and influence or respond to each other’s deci-
sions. Interactions at the system level that are also aggrega-
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Table 2. Summary table for individual behavior and decision making.
Theories Key considerations Strengths Limitations
Optimal decisions in ratio-
nal choice: individuals make
the decision that maximizes
their expected utility given eco-
nomic, social, and environmen-
tal constraints.
What are the agent’s prefer-
ences? What information (and
beliefs) do they have?
Highly researched theory with
strong theoretical foundation
and many applications
Individuals assumed to have
strong capabilities for informa-
tion processing and perfect self-
control
Bounded rationality and heuris-
tic decision making: individuals
have biases and heuristic deci-
sion rules that help them navi-
gate complex environments ef-
fectively.
Which cue order is used to
gather and evaluate informa-
tion? When do agents stop gath-
ering more information and de-
cide?
Simple decision processes that
capture observed biases in deci-
sion making
Suitable decision rules highly
context dependent
Learning: agents explore pos-
sible actions through repeated
learning from past experience.
How do agents interact with
their environment? What is the
trade-off between exploitation
of knowledge and exploration
of new options?
Captures information and belief
acquisition processes
High degree of randomness in
behavioral changes
tion mechanisms (e.g., voting procedures and markets) will
be discussed in Sect. 5.
The section starts with a review of strategic interactions
as modeled in classical game theory and dynamic interac-
tions in evolutionary approaches. Then, we address models
of social influence that are used to study opinion and pref-
erence formation or the transmission of cultural traits, i.e.,
culturally significant behaviors. Finally, we discuss how in-
teraction structures can be modeled as dynamic networks.
4.1 Strategic interactions between rational agents:
classical game theory
Game theory focuses on decision problems of “strategic in-
terdependence”, in which the utility that a decision maker
(called the player) gets depends not only on her own decision,
but also on the choices of others. These are often situations of
conflict or cooperation. Players choose an action (behavioral
option, control) based on a strategy, i.e., a rule specifying
which action to take in a given situation. Classical game the-
ory explores how rational actors identify strategies, usually
assuming the rationality of other players. However, rational
players can also base their choices on beliefs about others
players’ decisions, which can lead to an infinite regress of
mutual beliefs about each other’s decisions.
Formally, a game is described by what game theorists
call a game form or mechanism. The game form specifies
the actions ai(t) that agents can choose at well-defined time
points t from an action set Ai(t) that may vary over time,
having to respect all kinds of situation-dependent rules. The
game form may furthermore allow for communication with
the other agent(s) (signaling) or binding agreements (com-
mitment power). Simple social situations are formalized in
so-called normal-form games represented by a payoff ma-
trix specifying the individual utilities4 for all possible action
combinations, while more complex situations are modeled as
a stepwise movement through the nodes of a decision tree or
game tree (Gintis, 2009).
Classical game theory assumes that players form consis-
tent beliefs about each other’s unobservable strategies, in par-
ticular that the other’s behavior results from an optimal strat-
egy. However, multiplayer interaction and optimization often
leads to recursive relationships between beliefs and strate-
gies, which makes solving complex classical games often
very difficult. Many problems have several solutions, called
equilibria (not to be confused with the steady-state meaning
of the word), and call for sophisticated nonlinear fixed-point
solvers (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988). Only in special cases,
for example in which players have complete information and
moves are not simultaneous but alternating, game-theoretic
equilibria can easily be predicted by simple solution concepts
such as backwards induction (Gintis, 2009). In other cases,
one can identify strategies and belief combinations consis-
tent with the following two assumptions. First, each player
eventually chooses a strategy that is optimal given her be-
liefs about all other players’ strategies (rational behavior).
Second, each player’s eventual beliefs about other players’
strategies are correct (rational expectations). The solutions
are called Nash equilibria. However, many games have mul-
tiple Nash equilibria, and the question of which equilibrium
will be selected arises.
4Note that despite the term “payoff matrix”, these utilities are
unexplained attributes of the agents and need not have a relation to
monetary quantities.
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Therefore, game theorists try to narrow down the likely
strategy combinations by assuming additional forms of con-
sistency and rationality (Aumann, 2006), such as consistency
over time (sequential and subgame perfect equilibria), sta-
bility against small deviations (stable equilibria, Foster and
Young, 1990), or small random mistakes (trembling hand
perfect equilibria, Harsanyi and Selten, 1988). After a plau-
sible strategic equilibrium has been identified, it can be used
in a simulation of the actual behavior resulting from these
strategies over time, possibly including noise and mistakes.
As an example from the land-use context, consider two
farmers living on the same road. They get their irrigation wa-
ter from the same stream. A dispute over the use of water
emerges. Both may react to the actions of the other in sev-
eral turns. The upstream farmer located at the end of the road
may increase or decrease her water use and/or pay compensa-
tion for using too much water to the other. The downstream
farmer at the entrance of the road may demand compensa-
tion or block the road and thereby cut the access of the up-
stream farmer to other supplies. A complex game tree en-
codes which actions are feasible at which moment and what
are the consequences on players’ utilities. If it is possible to
specify the information and options available to the players
at each time point, then a classical game theoretical analy-
sis allows for the determination of the rational equilibrium
strategies that the farmers would follow.
Classical game theory is widely applied to interactions in
market settings in economics (see also Sect. 5.2), but in-
creasingly also in the social and political sciences to polit-
ical and voting behavior in public and social choice theory
(see, e.g., Ordeshook, 1986; Mueller, 2003, and Sect. 5.1).
For example, public choice theory studies strategic interac-
tions between groups of politicians, bureaucrats, and voters
with potentially completely different preferences and action
sets.
While many simple models of strategic interactions be-
tween rational and selfish agents will predict only low levels
of cooperation, more complex models can well explain how
bilateral and multilateral cooperation, consensus, and stable
social structure emerges (Kurths et al., 2015). This has been
shown in contexts such as multiplayer public goods problems
and international climate policy (e.g., Heitzig et al., 2011;
Heitzig, 2013).
To model relevant decision processes in the Earth system,
classical game-theoretic analysis could be used for describ-
ing strategic interactions between agents that could be as-
sumed as highly rational and well informed, i.e., interna-
tional negotiations of climate agreements between govern-
ments, bargaining between social partners, or monopolistic
competition between firms. Similarly, international negotia-
tions and their interactions with domestic policy can also be
framed as two-level or multilevel games (as in some mod-
els of political science, e.g., Putnam, 1988; Lisowski, 2002).
Furthermore, social choice theory could be used to simulate
simple voting procedures that (to a certain extent) determine
the goals of regional or national governments.
4.2 Interactions with dynamic strategies: evolutionary
approaches and learning in game theory
In game-theoretic settings, complex individual behavioral
rules are typically modeled as strategies specifying an action
for each node in the game tree. Consider as an example the
repeated version of the prisoners’ dilemma in which each of
two players can either “cooperate” or “defect” in each period
(Aumann, 2006). A typical complex strategy in this game
could involve reciprocity (defect temporarily after a defec-
tion of your opponent), forgiveness (every so often not re-
ciprocate), and making up (do not defect again after being
punished by a defection of your opponent after your own de-
fection).
Many or even most nodes of a game tree will not be visited
in the eventual realization of the game, and strategies may
involve the deliberate randomization of actions. Therefore,
strategies, unlike actual behavior, are principally unobserv-
able, and assumptions about them are hard to validate. For
this and other reasons, several kinds of additional assump-
tions are often made that constrain the set of strategies further
that a player can choose, e.g., assuming only very short mem-
ory or low farsightedness (myopic behavior) and disallowing
randomization, or allowing only strategies of a specific for-
mal structure such as heuristics (see Sect. 3.2).
The water conflict example from Sect. 4.1 bears some sim-
ilarity to the repeated prisoners’ dilemma in that the farmers’
possible actions can be interpreted as either defective (using
too much water, blocking the road) or cooperative (not do-
ing any of this, compensating for past defections). Assuming
different levels of farsightedness may thus lead to radically
different actions because myopic players would much more
likely get trapped in a cycle of alternating defections than
farsighted players. The latter would recognize some degree
of forgiveness because that maximizes long-term payoff and
would thus desist from defection with some probability. In
any case, both farmers’ choices can be modeled as depend-
ing on what they believe the other will likely do or how she
will react to the last action.
Evolutionary approaches in game theory study the interac-
tion of different strategies and analyze which strategies pre-
vail on a population level as a result of selection mechanisms.
Thus, in contrast to classical game theory, evolutionary ap-
proaches focus on the dynamics of strategy selection in pop-
ulations. The agent’s strategies may be hardwired, acquired,
or adapted by learning (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Macy
and Flache, 2002). Although many evolutionary techniques
in game theory are used in biology to study biological evo-
lution (variation through mutation, selection by fitness, and
reproduction with inheritance), evolutionary game theory can
be used to study all kinds of strategy changes in game-
theoretic settings, for instance cultural evolution (transmis-
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sion of memes), social learning through the imitation of suc-
cessful strategies, or the emergence of cooperation (Axelrod,
1984, 1997).
In an evolutionary game, a population of agents is di-
vided into factions with different strategies. They interact
in a formal game (given by a payoff matrix or game tree,
see Sect. 4.1), in which their strategy results in a fitness (or
payoff). The factions change according to some replicator
rules that depend on the acquired fitness. This can be mod-
eled using different techniques. Simple evolutionary games
in well-mixed large populations can be described with repli-
cator equations. The dynamics describing the relative change
in the factions with a particular strategy is proportional to the
deviation of the fitness of this faction from the average fitness
(Nowak, 2006).
Alternatively, the behavior resulting from evolutionary in-
teractions is often easy to simulate numerically as a discrete-
time dynamical system even for large numbers of players
if the individual action sets are finite or low-dimensional
and only certain simple types of strategies are considered.
This type of agent-based model (see Sect. 5.5) simply im-
plements features such as mutation or experimentation and
replication via strategy transfer (e.g., imitation and inheri-
tance) at the microlevel. Combined with network approaches
(see Sect. 4.4), the influence of interaction structure can also
be studied (Szabó and Fáth, 2007; Perc and Szolnoki, 2010).
Strategies can be characterized as evolutionary stable if a
population with this strategy cannot be invaded by another,
initially rare strategy. If a strategy is furthermore stable for
finite populations or noisy dynamics, it is called stochasti-
cally stable.
In our water conflict example, the farmers could use a
heuristic strategy (see Sect. 3.2) that determines how much
water they extract given the actions of the other. The evolu-
tion of the strategies could either be modeled with a learn-
ing algorithm, repeating the game again and again. Alterna-
tively, to determine feasible strategies in an evolutionary set-
ting, a meta-model could consider an ensemble of similar vil-
lages consisting of two farmers. The strategies of the farmers
would then be the result of either an imitation process be-
tween the villages or of an evolutionary process, assuming
that less successful villages die out over time.
Evolutionary approaches to game theory are a promising
framework to better understand the prevalence of certain hu-
man behaviors regarding interaction with the Earth system.
This is especially interesting regarding the modeling of long-
term cultural evolution and changes in individuals’ goals, be-
liefs, and decision strategies or the transmission of endoge-
nous preferences (Bowles, 1998).
4.3 Modeling social influence
Human behavior and its determinants (beliefs, goals, and
preferences) are strongly shaped by social influence, which
can result from various cognitive processes. Individuals may
be convinced by persuasive arguments (Myers, 1982), aim
to be similar to esteemed others (Akers et al., 1979), be
unsure about what is the best behavior in a given situation
(Bikhchandani et al., 1992), or perceive social pressure to
conform with others (Wood, 2000; Festinger et al., 1950;
Homans, 1950).
Models of social influence allow for the study of the out-
comes of repeated influence in social networks and have been
used to explain the formation of consensus, the development
of monoculture, the emergence of clustered opinion distri-
butions, and the emergence of opinion polarization, for in-
stance. Models of social influence are very general and can be
applied to any setting in which individuals exert some form
of influence on each other. However, seemingly innocent dif-
ferences in the formal implementation of social influence can
have decisive effects on the model outcomes, as the follow-
ing list of important modeling decisions documents.
A first question is how social influence changes individ-
ual attributes. For example, a farmer deciding when to till
his field might either choose the date that most of his neigh-
bors think is best, take the average of the proposed dates, or
even try to counter coordinate with disliked farmers. Clas-
sical models incorporate influence as averaging, which im-
plies that interacting individuals always grow more similar
over time (Friedkin and Johnsen, 2011). Averaging is an ac-
cepted and empirically supported model of influence result-
ing, for instance, from the social pressure that an actor exerts
on someone else (Takács et al., 2016). Models assume differ-
ent forms of averaging. Rather than following the arithmetic
average of all opinions, actors might only consider the major-
ity view (Nowak et al., 1990). In other models, social influ-
ence can lead to polarization (Myers, 1982). For instance, in
models of argument communication, actor opinions can turn
more extreme when the interaction partners provide them
with new arguments that support their own opinion (Mäs and
Flache, 2013; Mäs et al., 2013).
Second, modelers need to decide whether there is just one
or multiple dimensions of influence. For instance, it is of-
ten argued that political opinions are multidimensional and
cannot be captured by the one-dimensional left–right spec-
trum. Explaining the dynamics of opinion polarization and
clustering is often more difficult when multiple dimensions
are taken into account (Axelrod, 1997). Additionally, model
predictions often depend on whether the influence dimen-
sion is a discrete or a continuous variable. Models of indi-
viduals’ decisions about certain policies often model the de-
cisions as binary choices (Sznajd-Weron and Sznajd, 2000;
Martins, 2008). However, binary scales fail to capture the
fact that many opinions vary on a continuous scale and that
differences between individuals can therefore also increase
in a single dimension (Feldman, 2011; Jones, 2002; Stroud,
2010). Therefore, models that describe opinion polarization
usually treat opinions as continuous attributes.
A third critical question is how the interaction process is
modeled. In models of opinion dynamics, for example, influ-
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ence is bidirectional in that an actor who exerts influence on
someone else can also be influenced by the other (Macy et al.,
2013; Mäs et al., 2010). In diffusion models, in contrast, the
effective influence is directed. For instance, information can
spread only from informed to uninformed individuals, but not
the other way around. Furthermore, actors may be influenced
dyadically or multilaterally. Model outcomes often depend
on whether the influence that a group exerts on an actor is
modeled as a sequence of events involving dyads of actors
or as a single opinion update in which the actor considers all
contacts’ influences at once (Flache and Macy, 2011; Lorenz,
2005; Huckfeldt et al., 2004). In models that assume binary
influence dimensions, for instance, dyadic influence implies
that an agent copies a trait from her interaction partner. When
influence is multilateral, agents aggregate the influence ex-
erted by multiple interaction partners (using, e.g., the mode
of the neighbors’ opinions), which can imply that agents with
rare traits are not considered even though they would have
an influence in the case of dyadic influence events. For ex-
ample, a farmer seeking advice on whether to adopt a new
technology can either consult his friends one after another or
all together, likely leading to different outcomes if they have
different opinions on the matter.
Fourth, agents may slightly deviate from the influence
of their contacts. The exact type of these deviations affects
model outcomes and can introduce a source of diversity into
models of social influence (Mäs et al., 2010; Pineda et al.,
2009; Kurahashi-Nakamura et al., 2016). For instance, some
models of continuous opinion dynamics include deviations
as Gaussian noise, i.e., random values drawn from a nor-
mal distribution. In such a model, opinions in homogeneous
subgroups will fluctuate randomly and subgroups with sim-
ilar opinions can merge that would have remained split in a
model without deviations (Mäs et al., 2010). In other con-
texts, deviations are better modeled by uniformly distributed
noise, assuming that big deviations are as likely as small
ones. This can help to explain, for instance, the emergence
and stability of subgroups with different opinions that do not
emerge in settings with Gaussian noise5 (Pineda et al., 2009).
Finally, the effects of social influence depend on the struc-
ture of the network that determines who influences whom.
Complex dynamics can arise when this interaction network
is dynamic and depends on the attributes of the agents, as we
discuss in the following section.
Models of social influence are a promising approach to
explore how social transitions interact with the Earth sys-
tem, for example transitions of norms regarding admissible
resource use and emissions, lifestyle changes, and adoption
of new technology. They can be used to explore the condi-
tions under which social learning enables groups of agents to
adopt sustainable management practices.
5Gaussian noise needs to be very strong to generate enough
diversity for the emergence of subgroups with different opinions.
However, when noise is strong, subgroups will not be stable.
4.4 Modeling the interaction structure: (adaptive)
network approaches
In most of the models discussed in the previous section, the
social network is formally modeled as a graph (the mathe-
matical notion for a network): a collection of nodes that are
connected by links. In this mathematical framework, nodes
(vertices) represent agents and links (edges) indicate inter-
action, communication, or a social relationship. Agents can
only interact and thus influence each other if they are con-
nected by a link in the underlying network.
Classical social influence models study the dynamics of
influence on static networks, assuming that agents are al-
ways affected by the same subset of interaction partners (e.g.,
DeGroot, 1974; French, 1956; Friedkin and Johnsen, 2011).
These networks can be undirected or directed, possibly re-
stricting the direction of influence, but their structure does
not change over time. Furthermore, the topology of the net-
work, i.e., the arrangement of links, can be more or less ran-
dom or regular, clustered, and hierarchical. In social influ-
ence models on static networks, connected populations will
usually reach consensus in the long run.
Especially when modeling social processes over longer
timescales, it is reasonable to assume that the social network
is dynamic, i.e., that its structure evolves over time. This time
evolution can be independent of the dynamics on the network
and encoded in a temporal network (Holme and Saramäki,
2012). However, for many social processes, the structure of
the social network and the dynamics on the network (e.g., so-
cial influence) interact. Adaptive network models make the
removal of existing and the formation of new links between
agents dependent on attributes of the agents by building on
the insight that the social structure influences the behavior,
opinions, or beliefs of individual actors, which in turn drives
changes in social structure (Gross and Blasius, 2008).
Local update rules for the social network structure and
the agent behavior can be chosen very flexibly. Changes in
agent behaviors may be governed by rules such as random
or boundedly rational imitation of the behavior of network
neighbors (see above). Update rules for the network struc-
ture are often based on the insight that agents tend to be in-
fluenced by similar others and ignore those who hold too-
distant views (Wimmer and Lewis, 2010; McPherson et al.,
2001; Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954). Many models assume
that agents with similar characteristics tend to form new
links between each other (homophily) while breaking links
with agents having diverging characteristics (Axelrod, 1997;
Hegselmann and Krause, 2002; Deffuant et al., 2005). In
adaptive network models, homophily in combination with
social influence generates a positive feedback loop: influ-
ence increases similarity, which leads to more influence and
so on. Such models can explain, for instance, the emergence
and stability of multiple internally homogeneous but mutu-
ally different subgroups. Other applications of coevolution-
ary network models allow us to understand the presence
www.earth-syst-dynam.net/8/977/2017/ Earth Syst. Dynam., 8, 977–1007, 2017
990 F. Müller-Hansen et al.: Approaches to represent human behavior in ESMs
of social tipping points in opinion formation (Holme and
Newman, 2006), epidemic spreading (Gross et al., 2006),
the emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas (Perc and
Szolnoki, 2010), and the interdependence of coalition for-
mation with social networks (Auer et al., 2015). Such adap-
tive network models exhibit complex and nonlinear dynam-
ics such as phase transitions (Holme and Newman, 2006),
multi-stability (Wiedermann et al., 2015), oscillations in both
agent states and network structure (Gross et al., 2006), and
structural changes in network properties (Schleussner et al.,
2016).
While adaptive networks have so far mostly been applied
to networks of agents representing individuals, the frame-
work can in principle be used to model coevolutionary dy-
namics on various levels of social interaction as introduced
in Table 1. For instance, global complex network structures
such as financial risk networks between banks, trade net-
works between countries, transportation networks between
cities and other communication, organizational, and infras-
tructure networks can be modeled (Currarini et al., 2016).
Furthermore, approaches such as multi-layer and hierarchi-
cal networks or networks of networks allow for the modeling
of the interactions between different levels of a system (Boc-
caletti et al., 2014).
As an illustration, consider a community of agents each
harvesting a renewable resource, for example wood from a
forest. The agents interact on a social network, imitating the
harvesting effort of neighbors that harvest more and may
drop links to neighbors that use another effort. The interac-
tion of the resource dynamics with the network dynamics ei-
ther leads to a convergence of harvest efforts or a segregation
of the community into groups with higher or lower effort de-
pending on the model parameters (Wiedermann et al., 2015;
Barfuss et al., 2017).
In the context of long timescales in the Earth system, the
time evolution of social structures that determine interactions
with the environment are particularly important. Adaptive
networks offer a promising approach to modeling the struc-
tural change of the internal connectivity of a complex system
(Lade et al., 2017). For example, this could be applied to
explore mechanisms behind transitions between centralized
and decentralized infrastructure and organizational networks.
Table 3 summarizes the different modeling approaches
that focus on agent interactions in human decision making
and behavior. These interactions occur between two or sev-
eral agents. For including the effect of these interactions
into ESMs, their aggregate effects need to be taken into ac-
count as well. Therefore, we introduce in the next section ap-
proaches that allow us to aggregate individual behavior and
local interactions and to study the resulting macrolevel dy-
namics.
5 Aggregating behavior and decision making and
modeling dynamics at the system level
So far, we focused on theories and modeling techniques that
describe the decision processes and behavior of single actors,
their interactions, and the interaction structure. This section
builds on the previously discussed approaches and highlights
different aggregation methods for the behavior of an ensem-
ble or group of agents. This is an important step if models
shall describe system-level outcomes or collective decision
making and behavior in the context of Earth system mod-
eling. Aggregation techniques link modeling assumptions at
one level (often called the microlevel) to a higher level (the
macrolevel). They enable the analysis of macrolevel out-
comes and help to transfer models from one scale to another.
In general, this could link all levels introduced in Sect. 2.
In this section, we describe different approaches that are
used to make this connection. Analytical approaches gen-
erally represent groups of individual agents through some
macrolevel or average characteristic, often using simplifying
assumptions regarding the range of individual agents’ char-
acteristics. Simulation approaches describe individual behav-
ior and interactions and then compute the resulting aggregate
macroscopic dynamics.
The question of how to aggregate micro-processes to
macro-phenomena is not specific to modeling human deci-
sion making and behavior. The aggregation of individual be-
havior and the resulting description of collective action, such
as collective motion, is also an ongoing challenge in the nat-
ural sciences (Couzin, 2009). Specific assumptions about in-
dividual behavior and agent interactions have consequences
for the degree of complexity of the macrolevel description.
For instance, if agent goals and means do not interact, the
properties of single agents can often be added up. If, on the
contrary, agents influence each other’s goals or interact via
the environment, complex aggregate dynamics can arise.
The following sections discuss different aggregation tech-
niques, their underlying assumptions, and how these reflect
specific aggregation mechanisms. They are summarized in
Table 4.
5.1 Aggregation of preferences: social welfare and
voting
Rational choice approaches can also be used to model deci-
sion making by agents on higher levels from Table 1, for ex-
ample firms or countries. The “preferences” of such groups
of individuals are often represented by using as the opti-
mization target a social welfare function, which aggregates
the members’ utility functions either additively (“utilitarian”
welfare) or in some nonlinear way to represent inequality
aversion (e.g., the Gini–Sen, Atkinson–Theil–Foster, or egal-
itarian welfare functions; Dagum, 1990). To do so, a com-
mon scale of utility must be assumed. For example, individ-
ual utility in many economic models equals the logarithm
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Table 3. Summary table for agent interactions.
Approaches and frame-
works




What is the game structure (op-
tions, possible outcomes, tim-
ing, information flow) and what
are the players’ preferences?
Elegant solutions for low-
complexity problems
Difficult to solve for complex
games, agents cannot change





What competition and selection
mechanisms are there?
Can explain how dominant
strategies come about
Agent strategies are modeled as






How do influence mechanisms
change agent attributes? Is the
influence multilateral, dyadic,
or directed? How large are de-
viations?
Allows for the modeling of so-
cial learning, preference forma-
tion, and herding behavior





Is the social network static or
adaptive? How much random-
ness and hierarchy is in the
structure? How do agents form
new links?
Mathematical formalization to
model coevolution of social
structure with agent attributes
Micro-interactions mostly
dyadic and schematic
of the total monetary value of the individual’s consumption.
Social welfare functions are indeed used to find optimal pol-
icy, for example in cost–benefit analysis (Feldman and Ser-
rano, 2006). Consider a village of farmers growing crops that
need different amounts of water so that water management
policies affect farmer incomes. The effects of a water policy
could then be evaluated using the average, minimal, or av-
erage logarithmic income of farmers as a measure of social
welfare. The policy option maximizing the chosen indicator
should be implemented.
However, it is highly debated whether the utilities of dif-
ferent individuals can really be compared and substituted in
the sense that a drop in collective welfare resulting from an
actor’s decrease in utility can be compensated for by increas-
ing the utility of another actor. Defining suitable group pref-
erences is especially hard when group composition or size
changes over time as in intergenerational models (Millner,
2013). Also, in complex organizations, real decisions might
be nonoptimal for the group and more explicit models of ac-
tual decision procedures may be needed. Models in subfields
of game theory (bargaining, voting, or social choice theory)
explore the outcomes of formal protocols that are designed
to aggregate the group member’s heterogeneous preferences.
Under different voting or bargaining protocols, subgroups
may dominate the decision or the group may be able to reach
a compromise (Heitzig and Simmons, 2012). In the above ex-
ample, the farmers may not agree on a social welfare measure
that a policy should optimize but instead on a formal protocol
that would allow them to determine a policy for water usage
that is acceptable for all.
5.2 Aggregation via markets: economic models and
representative agents
A major part of the relevant interaction of contemporary
societies with the Earth system is related to the organiza-
tion of production and consumption on markets. Markets
not only mediate between the spheres of production and
consumption, but they can also be seen as a mechanism
to aggregate agents’ decisions and behavior. Economic the-
ory explores how goods and services are allocated and dis-
tributed among the various activities (sectors of production)
and agents (firms, households, governments) in an economy.
Goods and services may be consumed or can be the input
factors to economic production. Input factors for production
are usually labor and physical capital but can also include
financial capital, land, energy, natural resources, and inter-
mediate goods. In markets, the coordination between the de-
mand and supply of goods is mediated through prices that are
assumed to reflect information about the scarcity and produc-
tion costs of goods. Economics compares different kinds of
market settings (e.g., auctions, stock exchanges, international
trade) with respect to different criteria such as allocative ef-
ficiency.
Building on rational choice theory for modeling the de-
cisions of individual agents, microeconomic models in the
tradition of neoclassical economics analyze the conditions
for an equilibrium between supply and demand on single
markets (partial equilibrium theory) and between all mar-
kets (general equilibrium theory). The behavior of house-
holds and firms is usually modeled as utility maximization
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Table 4. Summary table for aggregation and system-level descriptions.
Approaches and frameworks Key considerations Strengths Limitations
Social utility and welfare: ag-
gregate individual utility, possi-
bly taking inequalities into ac-
count
How is inequality evaluated?
How is welfare compared be-
tween societies and genera-
tions?
Basis for cost–benefit analy-
sis, a widely applied decision
model for policy evaluation
Assumes that individual utility
can be compared on a common
scale
Aggregation via markets: rep-
resentative agents in economic
models
What goals or preferences do
representative agents have?
How efficient do market mech-
anisms allocate on which
spatial and temporal scales?
What market imperfections are
there?
Well-developed formalism




Assumes that aggregated agent
properties are similar to indi-
vidual ones to derive economic
equilibrium, coordination effort
between agents neglected
Social planner and economic
policy in integrated assessment
models: model ways to internal-
ize environmental externalities
Which economic policy in-
struments internalize environ-
mental externalities best? What
are plausible scenarios for pol-
icy implementation? How do
agents react to changes in pol-
icy?
Allows for the determination of
optimal paths for reaching soci-
etal goals
Models focus on production
and investment in the economy
Distributions and moments:
model heterogeneous agent at-
tributes via statistical properties
of distributions
Which heterogeneities are
most important for the macro-
outcome?
Systematic way to analytically
treat heterogeneities
Only applicable for rather sim-
ple behaviors and interactions
Agent-based models: simulate
agent behavior and interactions
explicitly to study emergent
macro-dynamics computation-
ally
What kind of agent types are
important? How do they make
decisions? How do the agents
interact with each other and the
environment?
Very flexible framework re-
garding assumptions about de-
cision rules and interactions
Models often with many un-
known parameters, difficult to
analyze mathematically
Dynamics at the system level Which crucial parameters in the
model can be influenced by de-
cision makers?
Allows for the exploration of
possible dynamical properties
of the system based on macro-
mechanisms
No explicit micro-foundation
under budget constraints and profit maximization under tech-
nological constraints in production, respectively. A central
assumption is that an economy is characterized by decreas-
ing marginal utility and diminishing returns: the additional
individual utility derived from the consumption of one ad-
ditional unit of some good is declining. Similarly, the addi-
tional production derived from an additional unit of a sin-
gle input factor is declining with its absolute amount when
holding other input factors fixed. Accordingly, the output of
the production process is described as a production function,
which is concave in its input factor arguments.
Assuming that there is perfect competition between pro-
ducers, resources and goods are allocated in a Pareto efficient
way so that no further redistribution is possible that benefits
somebody without making somebody else worse off (Varian,
2010). It has been shown that this leads to the emergence of
an equilibrium price for each good as the market is cleared
and supply meets demand (Arrow and Debreu, 1954). The
idea of this market equilibrium can be understood by the as-
sociated prices. The rational market participants trade goods
as long as there is somebody who is willing to offer some
good at a lower price than somebody else is willing to pay for
it. However, in markets dominated by a few or very hetero-
geneous agents, perfect competition cannot be assumed, and
price wars, hoarding, and cartel formation can occur. Such
situations can be described in models of oligopoly, bargain-
ing, or monopolistic competition but are sometimes difficult
to integrate into macroeconomic frameworks.
Macroeconomic models build on this microeconomic the-
ory by modeling the decision making of firms and house-
holds with the representative agent approach. A representa-
tive agent stands for an ensemble of agents or an average
agent of a population. An underlying assumption is that het-
erogeneities and local interactions cancel out for large num-
bers of agents. While representative firms model the sup-
ply of different sectors, the demand is determined by one or
several representative households. Representative firms and
households are assumed to act as if there were perfect compe-
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tition and they had no market power, i.e., that they optimize
their production or consumption taking the prices of goods
and production factors as given. The prices of production fac-
tors are assumed to equal the value of what they are able to
produce additionally by using one additional unit, i.e., their
marginal product. In simple macroeconomic models, repre-
sentative agents interact on perfect markets for all production
factors and goods. The solution of the associated optimiza-
tion problem (with constraints given by a system of nonlin-
ear algebraic equations) specifies the quantity and allocation
of input factors, their prices (wages and interest rates), and
the production and allocation of consumer goods. A change
in one constraint can therefore lead to adjustments in all sec-
tors and new equilibrium prices. For example, in an economy
with only two sectors, industry and agriculture, modeled by
two representative firms and a representative household, in-
creases in agricultural productivity may lead to the realloca-
tion of labor into the industrial sector and changes in wages.
In reality, prices can undergo rapid fluctuations, which
challenges the validity of equilibrium assumptions at least
in the short run. Furthermore, production factors may not
be fully employed as general equilibrium considerations sug-
gest. Other deviations from efficient equilibria are discussed
as market imperfections such as transaction costs, asymme-
tries in available information, and noncompetitive market
structures. Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models account for the consumption and investment deci-
sions of economic agents under uncertainty and explore the
consequences of stochastic shocks on public information
or technology for macroeconomic indicators. Many mod-
ern DSGE models also incorporate short-term market fric-
tions such as barriers to nominal price adjustments (“sticky”
prices) or other market imperfections (Wickens, 2008). How-
ever, these models still build on the key concept of general
equilibrium because they assume that the state of the econ-
omy is always near such an equilibrium and market clearance
is fast.
Economic growth models are used to study the long-term
dynamics of production and consumption and are therefore
an important approach for Earth system modeling. In sim-
ple growth models, a homogeneous product is produced per
time according to an aggregate production function. A part
of the output can be saved as new capital, while the remain-
ing output is consumed. The evolution of the capital stock
is given by a differential equation taking into account in-
vestments and capital depreciation. In the standard neoclassi-
cal growth model, the savings are endogenously determined
by the inter-temporal optimization of a representative house-
hold and equal investments. The household maximizes an
exponentially discounted utility stream (compare Sect. 3.1),
which is a function of consumption (Acemoglu, 2009). The
central decision of the representative household is how much
of the produced output it saves to increase production in the
future and therefore cannot consume and enjoy directly. Such
inter-temporal optimization problems can be solved either
computationally by discretization in time or analytically by
applying techniques from optimal control theory6. Besides
population growth, the only long-term drivers of growth in
the standard neoclassical model are exogenously modeled
increases in productivity through technological change. In
contrast, so-called endogenous growth models exhibit long-
run growth and endogenously account for increases in pro-
ductivity, for example through innovation, human capital, or
knowledge accumulation (Romer, 1986; Aghion and Howitt,
1998).
The use of representative agents in macroeconomic mod-
els has implications that stem from the implicit assumption
that the representative agent has the same properties as an
individual of the underlying group (Kirman, 1992; Rizvi,
1994). First, the approach neglects the fact that single agents
in the represented group have to coordinate themselves, leav-
ing out problems that arise due to incomplete and asymmetric
information. Second, a group of individual maximizers does
not necessarily imply collective maximization, challenging
the equivalence of the equilibrium outcome. Finally, the rep-
resentative agent approach may neglect emergent phenomena
from heterogeneous micro-interactions (Kirman, 2011).
In spite of the deficiencies of the representative agent ap-
proach, its application to markets allows for the aggregation
of behavior in simple and analytically tractable forms. Mod-
elers who wish to describe economic dynamics at an aggre-
gate level can rely on a well-developed theory that describes
many economic phenomena in a good approximation. In the
following section, we will discuss how this approach is used
to analyze the impacts of economic activities on the environ-
ment.
5.3 Modeling of decisions in integrated assessment
models: social planner and economic policy
Integrated assessment models (IAMs) comprise a large mod-
eling family that combine economic with environmental dy-
namics. However, the majority of currently used IAMs draws
on ideas from environmental economics. Using the concept
of environmental externality, they evaluate the extraction of
exhaustible resources, environmental pollution, and overex-
ploitation of ecosystems economically. Externalities are ben-
efits from or damages to the environment that are not re-
flected in prices and affect other agents in the economy (see,
e.g., Perman et al., 2003). These models therefore help to as-
sess economic policies that tackle environmental problems.
State-of-the-art global IAMs combine macroeconomic
representations of sectors like the energy and land systems
with models of the biophysical bases and environmental im-
pacts of these sectors. For example, CO2 emitted from burn-
6Optimal control theory deals with finding an optimal choice for
some control variables (often called policy) of a dynamical system
that optimizes a certain objective function using, for example, vari-
ational calculus (Kamien and Schwartz, 2012).
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ing fossil fuels is linked to economic production by car-
bon intensities and energy efficiencies in different production
technologies. IAMs often model technological change en-
dogenously, for example with investments in R&D or learn-
ing by doing (i.e., decreasing costs with increasing utilization
of a technology). Because of the possibility to induce tech-
nological change, the models capture the path dependencies
of investment decisions. Many IAMs take the perspective of
a social planner who makes decisions on behalf of society
by optimizing a social welfare function (see Sect. 5.1). It is
assumed that the social optimum equals the perfect market
outcome with economic regulations that internalize all exter-
nal effects (e.g., emission trading schemes).7
IAMs are mostly computational general or partial equi-
librium models describing market clearing between all sec-
tors or using exogenous projections of macroeconomic vari-
ables (see Sect. 5.2). They also differ with respect to inter-
temporal allocation. While inter-temporal optimization mod-
els use discounted social welfare functions to allocate in-
vestments and consumption optimally over time, recursive
dynamic models solve an equilibrium for every time step
(Babiker et al., 2009). Furthermore, IAMs are either designed
for (1) determining the optimal environmental outcomes of
a policy by making a complete welfare analysis between
different policy options or (2) evaluating different paths to
reach a political target with respect to their cost effectiveness
(Weyant et al., 1996). In the context of climate change, for
example, many IAMs have emission targets as constraints in
their optimization procedure and determine the best way to
reach them (Clarke et al., 2014).
For the analysis of global land use, IAMs combine
geographical and economic modeling frameworks (Lotze-
Campen et al., 2008; Hertel et al., 2009; Havlík et al., 2011).
These models are used, for example, to investigate the com-
petition between different land uses and trade-offs between
agricultural expansion and intensification. With the optimiza-
tion, land uses are instantaneously and globally allocated and
only constrained by environmental factors such as soil qual-
ity, water availability, and climate and protection policies.
IAMs differ from ESMs not only regarding their model-
ing technique (mostly optimization) but also regarding their
purpose: they help policy advisors to assess normative paths
that the economy could take to reach environmental policy
goals. While the decision about the policy is exogenous to the
model, the investment decisions within and between sectors
are modeled as a reaction to the political constraints. How-
ever, most IAMs do not account for possible changes on the
demand side, for example through changes in consumer pref-
erences for green products. A better cooperation between the
IAM and ESM communities, as called for by van Vuuren
et al. (2016) in this Special Issue, is certainly desirable be-
7This argument is based on the second fundamental theorem of
welfare economics; see, for example, Feldman and Serrano, 2006,
63–70.
cause some of the problems that arise when including human
decision making into ESMs have already been dealt with in
IAMs. However, when considering the coupling of IAMs and
ESMs with different methods (van Vuuren et al., 2012), mod-
elers have to keep in mind not only technical compatibility
(e.g., regarding the treatment of time in inter-temporal opti-
mization models) but also the possibly conflicting modeling
purposes.
5.4 Modeling agent heterogeneity via distributions and
moments
As discussed in Sect. 5.2, the representative agent approach
can hardly capture heterogeneity in human behavior and in-
teraction. In this section we describe analytical techniques
that allow for the representation of at least some forms of
agent heterogeneity.
An ensemble of similar agents can be modeled via sta-
tistical distributions if the agents are heterogeneous regard-
ing only some quantitative characteristics, for example pa-
rameters in utility functions or endowments such as income
and wealth. In simple models, techniques from statistical
physics and theoretical ecology can be used to derive a
macro-description from micro-decision processes and inter-
actions. For instance, the distribution of agent properties rep-
resenting an ensemble of agents can be described via a small
number of statistics such as mean, variance, and other mo-
ments or cumulants. The dynamics in the form of the dif-
ference or differential equations of such statistical parame-
ters can be derived by different kinds of approximations. A
common technique is moment closure that expresses the dy-
namics of lower moments in terms of higher-order moments.
At some order, the approximation is made by neglecting all
higher-order moments or approximating them by using func-
tions of lower-order ones (see, e.g., Goodman, 1953; Keel-
ing, 2000; Gillespie, 2009).
To aggregate simple interactions between single nodes in
network models, similar techniques can be used to describe
with differential equations how the occurrence of simple
subgraphs (motifs) changes with the dynamics on and of
the network. In network theory, these approaches are also
called moment closure, although the closure refers here to
neglecting more complicated subgraphs (e.g., Do and Gross,
2009; Rogers et al., 2012; Demirel et al., 2014). For ex-
ample, the simple pair approximation only considers differ-
ent subgraphs consisting of two vertices (agents) and one
link. To abstract from the finite-size effects of fluctuations
at the microlevel in stochastic modeling approaches and ar-
rive at deterministic equations, analytical calculations often
take the limit of the agent number going to infinity (in sta-
tistical physics called the thermodynamic limit; Reif, 1965;
Castellano et al., 2009).
Techniques based on moment closure and network approx-
imations are used to aggregate the dynamics of processes like
opinion formation on networks. This might be especially use-
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ful in reducing computational complexity when modeling so-
cial processes at intermediate levels of aggregation and could
allow for the investigation of the interplay of mesoscale so-
cial processes with the natural dynamics of the Earth system.
5.5 Aggregation in agent-based models
Agent-based modeling is a computational approach to mod-
eling the emergence of macrolevel or system-level out-
comes from microlevel interactions between individual, au-
tonomous agents and between agents and their social and/or
biophysical environments (Epstein, 1999; Gilbert, 2008; Ed-
monds and Meyer, 2013). In agent-based models (ABMs),
human behavior is not aggregated to the system level a pri-
ori, nor is it assumed that individual behavioral diversity can
be represented by a single representative agent as in many
macroeconomic models (see Sect. 5.2). Instead, the behav-
ior of heterogeneous agents or groups of agents is explic-
itly simulated to study the resulting aggregate outcomes. As
each action of an individual agent is interdependent, i.e., it
depends on the decisions or actions of other agents within
structures such as networks or space, local interactions can
give rise to complex, emergent patterns of aggregate behav-
ior at the macrolevel (Page, 2015). ABMs allow for the ex-
ploration of such nonlinear behavior in order to understand
possible future developments of the system or assess possible
unexpected outcomes of disturbances or policy interventions.
Agent-based modeling is widely used to study complex sys-
tems in computational social science (Conte and Paolucci,
2014), land-use science (Matthews et al., 2007), political sci-
ence (de Marchi and Page, 2014), computational economics
(Tesfatsion, 2006; Heckbert et al., 2010; Hamill and Gilbert,
2016), social–ecological systems research (Schlüter et al.,
2012; An, 2012), and ecology (Grimm and Railsback, 2005),
among others.8
Agents in ABMs can be individuals, households, firms, or
other collective actors, as well as other entities or groups
thereof, such as fish, fish populations, or plant functional
types. Agents are assumed to be diverse and heterogeneous;
i.e., they can belong to different types and can vary within
one type, respectively. Agent types can be characterized by
different attributes and decision-making models (e.g., large
and commercial versus small and traditional farms). Hetero-
geneity within a type is often represented through quantita-
tive differences in the values of these attributes (e.g., regard-
ing market access, social, or financial capital). The decision
making and behavior of the agents can be modeled with any
of the approaches introduced in Sect. 3 or can be based on
data or observations that are formalized in equations, deci-
sion trees, or other formal rules. In empirical ABMs, agents
8Note that in some scientific communities, this class of modeling
approaches is also known as multi-agent simulation (MAS; Bous-
quet and Le Page, 2004) or individual-based modeling (Grimm and
Railsback, 2005).
are often classified into empirically based agent types, which
are characterized by attributes and decision heuristics derived
from empirical data obtained through interviews or surveys
(Smajgl and Barreteau, 2014). Increasingly, social science
theories of human behavior beyond the rational actor are be-
ing used in ABMs to represent more realistic human decision
making. However, many challenges remain to translate these
theories for usage in ABMs (Schlüter et al., 2017).
Probabilistic and stochastic processes are often used to
capture uncertainty in and the impact of random events on
human decision making and assess the consequences for
macrolevel outcomes. For example, random events at the lo-
cal level, such as a random encounter between two agents
that results in a strategy change of one agent or a system-level
environmental variation, can give rise to nonlinear macro-
dynamics such as a sudden shift into a different system state
(Schlüter et al., 2016).
In addition to the behavior of the agents, ABMs of human–
environment systems incorporate the dynamics of the bio-
physical environment resulting from natural processes and
human actions insofar as it is relevant for the agents’ be-
havior and to understand feedbacks between human behav-
ior and environmental processes. For example, in an ABM
by Martin et al. (2016), a number of cattle ranchers can
move their livestock between grassland patches in a land-
scape. Overgrazing in one year decreases feed availability
in the following year because of the underlying biomass re-
growth dynamics. Agents decide how many cattle to graze
on a particular land patch based on their individual goals
or needs, information on the state of the grassland, beliefs
about the future, and interactions with other ranchers. The
model can reveal the interplay and success of different land-
use strategies on common land and assess their vulnerability
to shocks such as droughts. Most ABMs in the context of
land-use science have so far been developed for local or re-
gional study areas, taking into account local specificities and
fitting behavioral patterns to data acquired in the field (Parker
et al., 2003; Matthews et al., 2007; Groeneveld et al., 2017).
They are often combined with cellular automaton models that
describe the dynamics and state of the physical land system
(e.g., Heckbert, 2013). In these ABMs, the spatial embedding
of agents usually plays an important role (Stanilov, 2012).
Because ABMs can integrate a diversity of individual de-
cision making, heterogeneity of actors, and interactions be-
tween agents constrained by social networks or space and so-
cial and environmental processes, they are particularly suit-
able to study feedbacks between human action and biophys-
ical processes. In the context of ESM these may include hu-
man adaptive responses to environmental change, such as the
effects of climate change on agriculture and water availabil-
ity, to policies such as bioenergy production or the global
consequences of shifts in diets in particular regions. Agent-
based modeling is also a useful tool to unravel the causal
mechanisms underlying system-level phenomena (Epstein,
1999; Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010) and thus enhance the
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understanding of key human–environment interactions that
may give rise to observed Earth system dynamics. However,
because of their potentially high complexity and dimension-
ality in state and parameter space, ABMs are often difficult to
analyze and may require high computational capacities and
sophisticated model analysis techniques to understand their
dynamics beyond single trajectories.
Agent-based approaches can be applied without modeling
each individual agent explicitly. It suffices to model a repre-
sentative statistical sample of agents that depicts the impor-
tant heterogeneities of the underlying population. To capture
major types of human behavior, a recent proposal involves
agent functional types based on a theoretically derived typol-
ogy of agent attributes, interactions, and roles (Arneth et al.,
2014). This proposal is explored for modeling the adapta-
tion of land-use practices to climate change impacts (Murray-
Rust et al., 2014). Agent functional types represent a typol-
ogy that is theoretically constructed instead of data driven,
which is common in empirically based ABMs. Agent-based
approaches are promising for Earth system modeling be-
cause they allow modelers to address questions of interac-
tions across levels, for instance how global patterns of land
use emerge from interdependent regional and local land-use
decisions, which are in turn constrained by the emerging
global patterns. Furthermore, they would allow for the in-
tegration of uncertainty, agent heterogeneity, and the aggre-
gation of detailed technological and environmental changes
(Farmer et al., 2015).
5.6 Dynamics at the system level: system dynamics,
stock-flow consistent, and input–output models
This final subsection discusses modeling approaches with-
out explicit micro-foundations. Decisions in such models are
not modeled explicitly with one of the options discussed in
Sect. 3 but, as policy decisions in integrated assessment mod-
els, through the construction of different scenarios for the
evolution of crucial exogenous parameters in the model.
Global system dynamics models describe the economy,
population, and crucial parts of the Earth system and their
dynamic interactions at the level of aggregate dynamic vari-
ables, usually modeling the dynamics as ordinary differential
equations or difference equations to project future develop-
ments. The equations are often built on stylized facts about
the dynamics of the underlying subsystems and are linked
by functions with typically many parameters. Modelers em-
ploy system dynamics models to develop scenarios based on
different sets of model parameters and assess the system sta-
bility and transient dynamics. In comparison to equilibrium
approaches, system dynamics models capture the inertia of
socioeconomic systems at the cost of a higher dimensional
parameter space. This can lead to more complex dynamics
like oscillations or overshooting. System dynamics models
can be very detailed, like the World3 model commissioned by
the Club of Rome for their famous report “Limits to Growth”
(Meadows et al., 1972, 2004), the GUMBO model (Boumans
et al., 2002), or the International Futures model (Hughes,
1999). Subsystems of such models comprise the human pop-
ulation (sometimes disaggregated between regions and age
groups), the agricultural and industrial sector, and the state
of the environment (pollution and resource availability). Sim-
pler models describe the dynamics of only a few aggregated
variables at the global level (Kellie-Smith and Cox, 2011) or
confined to a region (Brander and Taylor, 1998).
Other system-level approaches to macroeconomic model-
ing emphasize self-reinforcing processes in the economy and
point at positive feedback mechanisms, resulting in multi-
stability or even instability (e.g., increasing returns to scale in
production and self-amplification of expectations during eco-
nomic bubbles). For example, post-Keynesian economists
use stock-flow consistent models to track the complete mone-
tary flows in an economy in which low aggregate demand can
lead to underutilization of production factors and the state
plays an active role to stabilize the economy. In these mod-
els, a social accounting matrix provides a detailed framework
of transactions (e.g., monetary flows) between households,
firms, and the government, which hold stocks of assets and
commodities (Godley and Lavoie, 2007).
Input–output models track flows to much more detail be-
tween different industries or sectors of production (Leontief,
1986; Ten Raa, 2005; Miller and Blair, 2009). Each industry
or production process is modeled by a “Leontief” production
function, which is characterized by fixed proportions of input
factors that depend on the available technology. For exam-
ple, an input–output model can describe which input factors,
such as land, fertilizer, machinery, irrigation water, and la-
bor, are required for satisfying the demand of an agricultural
commodity with a mix of production techniques. The model
would consider that some of these inputs have to be pro-
duced themselves using other types of inputs. Outputs also
include unwanted side products, such as manure in cattle pro-
duction. Such models are used, for instance, to explore how
changes in demand would lead to higher-order effects along
the supply chain. Regional input–output models also account
for spatial heterogeneity and are used, for example, to eval-
uate the possible impacts of extreme climate events on the
global supply chain (Bierkandt et al., 2014).
While the approaches discussed above focus on the mon-
etary dimension of capital and goods, models from ecolog-
ical economics (van den Bergh, 2001) track material flows
or integrate material with financial accounting. For exam-
ple, input–output modeling has been extended to analyze
industrial metabolism, i.e., material and energy flows and
their environmental impacts in modern economies (Fischer-
Kowalski and Haberl, 1997; Ayres and Ayres, 2002; Suh,
2009). Regionalized versions of such models can, for in-
stance, be used to estimate the environmental footprint that
industrialized countries have in other regions (Wiedmann,
2009). In the emerging field of ecological macroeconomics
(see Hardt and O’Neill, 2017, for a detailed review of mod-
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eling approaches), stock-flow consistent and input–output
models have been combined into one framework for tracking
financial and material flows (Berg et al., 2015). Other eco-
logical models use the flow–fund approach by Georgescu-
Roegen (1971) or combine it with stock-flow consistent mod-
eling approaches (Dafermos et al., 2017). While the flow
concept refers to a stock per time, a fund is the potential-
ity of a system to provide a service. The important difference
lies in the observation that a stock can be depleted or accu-
mulated in one time step, while a fund can provide its ser-
vice only once per time step. This distinction reflects phys-
ical constraints on the production process that have impor-
tant consequences for modeling the social metabolism. Gar-
rett (2015) and Jarvis et al. (2015) in this Special Issue pro-
vide an extreme view on the dynamics of social metabolism
based only on thermodynamic considerations without taking
human decision making or agency into account.
In order to make approaches that only consider the sys-
tem level useful for modeling the impact of humans on the
Earth system, they could be combined with approaches that
model the development of new production technologies and
how the deployment of new technologies is affected by deci-
sions at different levels (consumers, firms, and governments).
Even if this integration with decision models proves difficult,
the approaches discussed in this section can help link social
and environmental dynamics in new ways, providing an im-
portant methodology to include humans into ESMs.
6 Discussion
In the previous three sections, we showed that there is a diver-
sity of approaches to model individual human decision mak-
ing and behavior, to describe interactions between agents,
and to aggregate these processes. The discussion of strengths
and limitations of the modeling approaches showed possible
underlying assumptions and connections to theories of hu-
man behavior. While some modeling techniques are compat-
ible with many theories of human behavior or decision mak-
ing and can thus be used with a variety of assumptions, other
techniques significantly constrain possible assumptions.
For many relevant questions in global environmental
change research, a dynamical representation of humans in
ESMs may not be necessary. If behavioral patterns are not
expected to change over the relevant timescales or feedbacks
between natural and social dynamics are sufficiently weak,
modelers can simply use conventional scenario approaches.
However, if behavioral patterns are expected to change
over time and give rise to strong feedbacks with the envi-
ronment, then an explicit representation of human decision
making will provide new insights into the joint dynamics. In
this case, modelers have to carefully choose which assump-
tions about human behavior and decision making are plau-
sible for their specific modeling purpose. Modeling choices
require a constant interplay between model development and
the research questions that drive it.
Because there is no general theory of human decision
making and behavior, especially not for social collectives,
we cannot provide a specific recipe for including humans
into ESMs. In Table 5, we summarize the approaches we
discussed in this paper and collect important questions to
guide the choice of appropriate model assumptions and ap-
proaches. To find the right assumptions for a specific context,
modelers can further build on and consult existing social sci-
entific research, even though ambiguities due to a fragmen-
tation of the literature between opposing schools of thought
and difficulties in generalizing single case studies from their
local or cultural specificities can make some of the research
difficult to access. In case of doubt, modelers can team up
with social scientists to conduct empirical research in the
specific context needed to select the appropriate approach.
The selection of a modeling technique compatible with the
chosen assumptions also has to consider its limitations for
meaningfully answerable research questions and the analy-
ses that it can provide. In the following, we discuss some im-
portant considerations regarding individual decision making,
interactions, and aggregation.
Concerning individual agents, we identified three impor-
tant determinants in decision models: motives, restrictions,
and decision rules. Modelers need to take the many factors
into account that influence which assumptions about each
of these three determinants are applicable in a given con-
text. For instance, modelers can make different assumptions
about whether agents only consider financial incentives or
also take into account other criteria, such as a desire for fair
outcome distributions (Opp, 1999), depending on whether a
situation is more or less competitive or cooperative. Research
shows that the relevance of motives and goals can vary over
time and that surprisingly subtle cues can change their im-
portance (Lindenberg, 1990; Tversky and Kahneman, 1985).
Likewise, the choice of a plausible decision rule depends on
the studied context. For instance, a decision rule that requires
complex computations may be relatively plausible in con-
texts in which agents make decisions with important conse-
quences and in which they have the information and time
needed to compare alternatives. When stakes are low and
time to decide is limited, however, more simple decision
rules are certainly more plausible. Cognitively demanding
decision rules are also more plausible when decision makers
are collectives, such as companies and governments. Some-
times, it may even be reasonable to assume that agents use
combinations of different decision models (Camerer and Ho,
1999).
Important criteria for choosing an appropriate model of
agent interactions are the type and setting of interactions,
the assumptions that agents make about each other, the in-
fluence they may exert on each other, and the structure of
interactions. For example, interactions in competitive envi-
ronments will only lead to cooperation if this is individually
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beneficial. In such environments, agents may assume that the
others form their strategies rationally. In less competitive set-
tings in which social norms and traditions play a crucial role,
however, behavior may not be strategically chosen but rather
adaptively, for example by imitating other agents. This might
also be important on timescales at which cultural evolution
happens. Furthermore, social settings might favor interac-
tions in which agents primarily exchange opinions or share
beliefs and influence each other’s decisions in this way.
Crucial criteria for the choice of an appropriate aggrega-
tion technique for behavior and interactions are the prop-
erties of relevant economic and political institutions (e.g.,
market mechanisms or voting procedures), decision criteria
for collective agents, heterogeneity of modeled agents, avail-
ability of data to evaluate the model, and relevant time and
spatial scales of macro-descriptions. Depending on the spe-
cific research questions, modelers have to choose the aggre-
gation method that fits the real-world systems of interest and
describes their aggregation mechanisms and aggregate be-
havior reasonably. Whether the aggregate behavior of many
agents is better represented by a representative agent as in
macroeconomic models, a distribution of agent characteris-
tics, or many diverse individuals as in ABMs depends on the
importance of agent heterogeneity and interaction structures
such as networks or spatial embeddedness. The choice of an
aggregation technique then determines which characteristics
and processes of the system are modeled explicitly and which
assumptions influence the form of the model only implicitly.
If the local structure of interaction matters, this would re-
quire a gridded or networked approach; otherwise a mean
field approximation is justified. Similar choices have to be
made in classical ESMs. For example, the interaction of
ocean and atmosphere temperature near the surface on a spa-
tial grid could be modeled either by only taking interactions
between neighboring grid points into account or by coupling
the ocean temperature to the atmospheric mean field. Anal-
ogously, the interactions between groups of two types of
agents may be modeled explicitly on a social network. How-
ever, it might also suffice to only consider interactions be-
tween two agents representing the mean of each group. The
question of whether the interaction structure matters often
cannot be answered a priori but may be the result of a com-
parison between an approximation and an explicit simula-
tion.
For the choice of an appropriate aggregation technique,
modelers also have to decide on the level of detail to describe
the system and whether the modeling of individuals or in-
termediate levels of the system is necessary or an aggregate
description suffices. This choice depends on the expected im-
portance of interactions and heterogeneity in an assumed set
of agents. As an example from classical Earth system model-
ing, consider vegetation models in which modelers choose
between the simulation of representative plant functional
types or ensembles of individual adaptive plants depending
on whether they consider the interaction and heterogeneity
important for the macro-dynamics. Analogously, a model of
social dynamics may use a representative agent approach
or model heterogeneous agents explicitly in an agent-based
model depending on the research question. The choice be-
tween a detailed and aggregated description depends strongly
on the model purpose. For example, if the goal is to predict
the future development of a system, a system-level descrip-
tion could suffice, while a more detailed model (e.g., ABM)
would be needed for understanding the mechanisms that ex-
plain these outcomes in terms of the underlying heteroge-
neous responses of individuals. Likewise, for a normative
model aiming to identify the action that maximizes social
welfare, an intermediate level of detail could suffice, taking
only specific agent heterogeneities into account.
In general, the evaluation of timescales can help in many
of the abovementioned modeling choices to decide whether
the social processes and properties of socioeconomic units
should be represented as evolving over time, can be fixed, or
need not be modeled explicitly at all for a macrolevel descrip-
tion of the system. For example, CO2 concentration in global
circulation models can be assumed to be well mixed for the
atmosphere, while assuming this for the ocean with its slow
convection would considerably distort results on politically
relevant timescales (Mathesius et al., 2015). Similarly, gen-
eral equilibrium models can provide a good description if the
convergence of prices happens on fast timescales and market
imperfections are negligible. Dynamical system models, on
the contrary, may be more appropriate to describe systems
with a high inertia that operate far from equilibrium due to
continuous changes in system parameters and slow conver-
gence. A decisive question is therefore if the timescales of
processes in the system allow for a separation of scales. For
instance, this is possible if the micro-interactions are some
orders of magnitude faster than changes in system parame-
ters or boundary conditions. Similar considerations apply for
spatial scales.
As we have shown in the examples above, there are many
similarities regarding the choice of modeling techniques and
assumptions in ESMs and models of socioeconomic systems.
However, fundamental differences between the modeled sys-
tems pose a big challenge for an informed choice of modeling
techniques. ESMs can often build on physical laws describ-
ing micro-interactions that can be tested and scrutinized. Of
course this can result in very complex macroscopic system
behavior with high uncertainties, but models including hu-
man behavior have to draw on a variety of accounts of basic
motivations in human decision making. These motivations
may change over time while societies evolve and humans
change their actions because of new available knowledge.
This can lead to a crucial feedback between the real world
and models. Agents (e.g., policy makers) may decide differ-
ently when they take the information provided by model pro-
jections into account. Therefore, modeling choices regard-
ing human behavior might change this behavior. This as-
pect of human reflexivity makes models of human societies
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Table 5. Collection of questions that may guide the choice of modeling approaches and assumptions.
Category Important modeling questions
Modeling individual decision
making and behavior
What goals do agents pursue? What constraints do they have? What decision rules do agents
use? How do agents acquire information and beliefs about their environment?
Modeling interactions between
agents
Do agents interact in a competitive environment, or are interactions primarily governed by so-
cial norms? What do agents assume about each other’s rationality? Do agents choose actions
strategically or adaptively? How are agents influenced by others regarding their beliefs and
norms? What structure do the interactions have, and how does the structure evolve?
Aggregating behavior and mod-
eling dynamics at the system
level
Are decisions aggregated through political institutions (e.g., voting procedures) or markets?
According to what criteria do policy makers decide, and what controls do they have? Is the
heterogeneity of agent characteristics and interactions important? Which macrolevel measures
are dynamic and which can be assumed to be fixed?
fundamentally different from natural science models and is
closely linked to the important difference in social model-
ing between normative and descriptive model purposes. For
example, models that optimize social welfare usually reflect
the goal that a government should pursue and therefore have
a normative purpose. However, if this model is used to guide
policy making while taking into account the actual and per-
ceived controls of policy makers and considers the effect of
compromises between different interest groups, it could also
describe its behavior. This example shows the often intricate
interconnections between normative and descriptive assump-
tions in decision modeling that modelers should be aware of.
This is further complicated by the observation that the
same assumption may be understood in one model as a de-
scriptive (positive) statement, whereas in another model it
may be meant as a prescriptive (normative) one. For exam-
ple, in a model of agricultural markets, the assumption that
big commercial farms maximize their profits might be a rea-
sonable descriptive approximation. In contrast, in a model
that asks how smallholder farms could survive under com-
petitive market conditions, the same assumption gets a strong
normative content.
Another difficulty is that model choices are often not only
based on the most plausible assumptions about human de-
cision making but are also strongly influenced by consid-
erations about the assumption’s mathematical convenience.
Choosing assumptions for technical reasons, for example
mathematical simplicity and tractability, may be problematic
because it remains unexplained how they are related to the
real world. Because not all assumptions can be easily imple-
mented in formal models, a trade-off often has to be found
between the plausibility and technical practicality of the as-
sumptions.
Most of the global models reviewed here that describe hu-
man interactions with the Earth system are based on eco-
nomic assumptions about the behavior of humans and so-
cieties. They are often only linked in a one-way fashion to
the biogeophysical part of the Earth system. Including closed
feedback loops between social and environmental dynamics
into ESMs is still a big challenge. To advance this endeavor,
more work is needed to synthesize modeling approaches that
can represent various aspects of human behavior in the con-
text of global modeling, even if the need for generaliza-
tions and the formalization of human behavior is sometimes
met with skepticism or rejection by social scientists who
emphasize the context dependence and idiosyncrasy of hu-
man behavior. Of course, models that use simple theories
of human decision making and behavior to describe human–
environment interactions in the global context cannot claim
to capture all real-world social interactions. If models consid-
ered the heterogeneity of agents in all relevant aspects, they
would have to be much more complex than all models that
have been developed to date. However, in many real-life set-
tings, even simple conceptual models of social mechanisms
are good descriptions of the key features of the dynamics at
work, as we have highlighted throughout this review. Includ-
ing such formal descriptions of idealized social mechanisms
can therefore be a good starting point for understanding feed-
backs in the Earth system and their qualitative consequences,
which have so far not been considered explicitly in global
models.
7 Summary and conclusion
In this review, we discussed common modeling techniques
and theories that could be potentially used to include hu-
man decision making and the resulting feedbacks with envi-
ronmental dynamics into Earth system models (ESMs). Al-
though we could only discuss the basic aspects of the pre-
sented modeling techniques, it is apparent that modelers who
want to include humans into ESMs are confronted with cru-
cial choices of which assumptions to make about human be-
havior and which appropriate techniques to use.
As Table 5 summarizes, we discussed techniques and
modeling assumptions in three different categories. First, in-
dividual decision modeling focuses on decision processes
and the resulting behavior of single agents and therefore has
to make assumptions about the determinants of choices be-
tween behavioral options. Second, models of interactions be-
tween agents capture how decisions depend upon each other
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and how agents influence each other regarding different deci-
sion criteria. Third, modeling techniques that aggregate agent
behavior and interactions to a system-level description are
crucial for modeling human behavior at scales relevant for
the Earth system and require ingredients from the first and
second categories. To include human decision making into
ESMs, techniques and assumptions from these three cate-
gories have to be combined. Finally, we discussed important
questions regarding the choice of modeling approaches and
their interrelation with assumptions about human behavior
and decision making, for example regarding the level of de-
scription and the relevant timescales but also the difficulties
that can arise due to human reflexivity and the amalgamation
of normative and descriptive assumptions in models.
Most formal models that describe human behavior in
global environmental contexts are based on economic ap-
proaches. This is not surprising because many human inter-
actions with the environment are driven by economic forces,
and economics has a stronger focus on formal models than
other social sciences. However, we think that it is necessary
to advance research that builds on insights from other so-
cial sciences and applies social modeling and simulation in
the context of global environmental change. One important
aim of such research would be to provide a theoretical basis
for including processes of social evolution and institutional
development into ESMs. If we want to explore the possible
futures of the Earth, we need to get a better understanding of
how the long-term dynamics of the Earth system are shaped
by these cultural and social processes.
A new generation of ESMs can build on various ap-
proaches, some of which we reviewed here, to include hu-
man decision making and behavior explicitly into Earth sys-
tem dynamics. However, ambitious endeavors like this have
to take into account that the modeling of human behavior and
social processes is a contested topic, and the assumptions and
corresponding modeling techniques need to be chosen care-
fully with an awareness of their strengths and limitations for
the specific modeling purpose.
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